Notes to pp. 91 99 in .NET Draw datamatrix 2d barcode in .NET Notes to pp. 91 99

Notes to pp. 91 99 generate, create gs1 datamatrix barcode none for .net projects QR Code Safty no exception is allowed .net framework Data Matrix 2d barcode as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Empirical universality is only an arbitrary extension of a validity holding in most cases to one which holds in all (KrV B 3 4).

Just as empirically based universality is insuf cient to ground theoretical rules that allow of no possible exception, so it is insuf cient to ground practical rules that allow of none. See KpV 26. 28.

Kant claims to prove the validity of the principle, [A]ct on no other maxim than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law (GMS 447).. 5: Criteria for the Supreme Principle of Morality 1. 6 explores objectio Data Matrix ECC200 for .NET ns to this rst criterion.

2. This section has been adapted from my paper The Kantian Moral Worth of Actions Contrary to Duty, Zeitschrift f r Philosophische Forschung 53 (1999): u 45 66. 3.

This interpretation is not wholly unproblematic. In the Preface to the Groundwork, Kant remarks that moral laws require a power of judgment sharpened by experience, partly in order to distinguish in which cases they are applicable and partly to provide them with access to the will of the human being and ef cacy for his ful llment of them (GMS 389). The question is: according to Kant, does everyone, that is, every rational agent, acquire this power of judgment in the course of maturing Of course, if Kant would answer af rmatively, then the interpretation at hand is not really threatened by this remark.

4. Allison, for example, says: Starting with the assumption, itself questionable, that actions performed from duty cannot, objectively speaking, be contrary to duty, he proposes to limit his consideration to actions that are at least in agreement with duty (pflichtm ig). See Henry E.

Allison, Kant s Theory of Freedom a (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 109. 5. Curzer adopts this interpretation.

See Howard Curzer, From Duty, Moral Worth, Good Will, Dialogue 36 (1997): 290 291. 6. That Kant would hold this is not as obvious as it might at rst appear.

Kant asserts that duties cannot con ict: if at the same time two moral rules prescribe different actions, then it cannot be a duty to act in accordance with both. See MS 224. But suppose that disagreeing with Kant on this score, an agent holds that duties can con ict.

Further suppose that here and now she believes that she has con icting duties, a duty to keep a promise to meet a student and a duty to take her mother-in-law to the airport. It seems that in performing the latter action, she could both believe that she was acting contrary to duty (i.e.

, her duty not to break her promises), yet be acting from duty. Moreover, Kant might acknowledge this possibility, although he would insist that the agent was mistaken in her belief that duties can con ict. I think it is clear that if an agent believes along with Kant that duties cannot con ict, then she could not, in doing something she believed to be contrary to duty, be acting from duty.

7. It is striking that in a work where Kant is at pains to explore the concept of duty, he mentions not one example of an action done from duty but which con icts with duty. 8.

At KpV 81, Kant says that moral worth must be placed solely in this: that the action takes place from duty, that is, for the sake of the law alone. . Notes to pp. 100 101 9. At KpV 79, Kant says .net framework datamatrix 2d barcode : A maxim is .

. . morally genuine only if it rests solely on the interest one takes in compliance with the law.

10. Here one might suggest the following. Supererogatory actions are not morally required; they are optional in the sense of beyond what duty requires.

Nevertheless, in performing one (e.g., by jumping on a live grenade to save one s comrades), one might put aside entirely the in uence of inclination.

So there are some actions that are neither morally required nor at all in uenced by inclination. In response, note rst that Kant does not recognize the category of supererogatory actions. For discussion of why, see Marcia W.

Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), chap. 1. Moreover, even if Kant did recognize this category, a supererogatory action would not be done from duty in his sense.

In an action from duty, an agent s will is determined by her representation of the law in itself (GMS 401). But in a supererogatory action, her will is presumably not determined simply by her representation of the law, since she is aiming above and beyond what the law requires. 11.

See GMS 402 for evidence that Kant recognizes this point. 12. For discussion of Kant s notion of respect, see Allison, Kant s Theory of Freedom, 120 128, and Ralph C.

S. Walker, Achtung in the Grundlegung, in Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar, ed. Otfried H ffe (Frankfurt o am Main: Klostermann, 1989), 97 116.

13. See Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 13 17.

See also Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, 129 130. 14. See Herman, Practice, 16.

15. It is striking that Herman does not cite a single case of Kant s mentioning that an agent performs a particular action from duty as a limiting condition or secondary motive. 16.

This point is made by H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 47 50; Herman, Practice, 12; Allison, Kant s Theory of Freedom, 110 111; and Baron, Kantian Ethics, 150.

Both Allison and Baron note that Kant implies early in his Groundwork I discussion of duty that an agent s having an inclination to do something does not in itself preclude him from doing it from duty. Kant suggests that to determine whether an action is from duty is dif cult in cases when an action conforms with duty and the subject has, besides, an immediate inclination to it (GMS 397). But why, Allison and Baron rightly ask, would he suggest this to be dif cult if he adopted the view that having an immediate inclination to do something itself precluded one from doing it from duty If he adopted this view, then, it seems he would simply say that if one has an immediate inclination to an action, then it is thereby impossible for him to do it from duty.

(I discuss Kant s distinction between mediate and immediate inclination in section 5.5.) For an opposing interpretation of Kant, see Noa Latham, Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Action Solely from the Motive of Duty, Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 599 618.

17. Of course, Kant does hold that it is impossible for me to be certain that I have kept the promise from this motive. See GMS 407.

18. Allison puts the point in this way. See Allison, Kant s Theory of Freedom, 111.

19. In addition to Baron, Kantian Ethics, 146 187, see, for example, Paul Benson, Moral Worth, Philosophical Studies 51 (1987): 365 382; Paul Guyer, Kant on.
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