Dignity and the formula of humanity in .NET Include 2d Data Matrix barcode in .NET Dignity and the formula of humanity

Dignity and the formula of humanity generate, create 2d data matrix barcode none on .net projects Code 11 of why a mo Visual Studio .NET data matrix barcodes rally good being abides by this formula. His answer (in brief) is because morality has an elevated worth (i.

e. only moral dictates are categorical). The passage begins (G IV 434):.

The practic al necessity of acting in accordance with this principle [the formula of autonomy], that is, duty, does not rest at all on inclinations . Reason accordingly does so from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law other than that which he himself at the same time gives..

The questio Visual Studio .NET datamatrix 2d barcode n Kant addresses in the main passage on dignity is accordingly a question about moral motivation in the widest sense. The end of the quotation makes clear that Kant has the dignity of a morally good being in mind.

A morally good being does not abide by the formula of autonomy because of an inclination, but from the idea of the dignity of being morally good.42 Kant goes on to elucidate dignity as elevation: what on the other hand is raised above all price (G IV 434) has a dignity. He makes clear that it is morality that is raised above price, and that [h]ence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity (G IV 435).

If this were a statement that morality and humanity have an absolute value, this sentence would be problematic. There could be con icts between the requirements to value above all else both humanity and a good will.43 If, however, Kant understands dignity to be an elevated position and not a value, then the statement makes sense: morality is elevated over merely relative values, humanity is elevated over the rest of nature in virtue of being capable of morality.

I therefore do not read his claim that morality has an inner worth, that is, dignity (G IV 435) as a de nition of dignity as inner worth, but to emphasize inner 44 (and later incomparable , cf. G IV 436). Morality has an inner and incomparable worth, i.

e. an elevated worth or an elevated position in terms of worth. This reading is equally possible, and it is supported both by the context of the passage, and by Kant s wider use of dignity .

45 The same holds for the second passage in which Kant seems to de ne dignity as absolute worth. Kant says that the moral law determines all. 42 43 44 45. This is a c Data Matrix for .NET ommon theme throughout Kant s writings, cf. e.

g. MdS VI 483, VI 459; CpV V 152; Religion VI 183; The Con ict of the Faculties VII 58. Cf.

Kerstein, Deriving the Formula of Humanity , pp. 216 20. Kant uses inner to express the negative claim that something is not merely relative, cf.

L hrer, Menschliche W rde, p. 35. See again my Kant s Conception of Human Dignity , Kant-Studien (forthcoming).

. oliver sensen worth, and gs1 datamatrix barcode for .NET that therefore the law-giving that determines all worth must have a dignity and an unconditional worth. I have argued in Section 2 that this is not a valid argument for establishing that all human beings have an unconditional worth.

In fact, this passage con rms the opposite: nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for it (G IV 435 .46): there is no value (of human beings or otherwise) that grounds the moral law. It is the other way around.

What the passage says is that the moral law determines all worth, and that therefore the process of giving law, i.e. actually being morally good, must have the unconditional or elevated worth of morality and its elevated position (dignity).

Kant can therefore conclude the main passage on dignity in the Groundwork by saying that autonomy, i.e. the process of giving universal law (or being morally good), is the ground of the realized dignity of rational nature (G IV 436).

Rather than justifying a value of human beings that can ground the requirement to respect them, the main passage on dignity repeats familiar claims from the Groundwork. One should not follow the categorical imperative out of inclination, but because of the unconditional worth of morality (i.e.

moral dictates are categorical). Kant uses dignity to express the elevated position morality has in terms of worth. The main passage on dignity in the Groundwork is therefore compatible with my interpretation of Kant s view as to why one should respect others.

5 conclusion In this chapter I have argued that, on a close reading of Kant s text, the standard view of Kant s justi cation for the requirement to respect others does not stand up. Kant grounds the requirement to respect others not on an absolute value property all human beings possess, but on the categorical imperative. Concepts like worth , end-in-itself and dignity are secondary concepts for Kant.

None of them is foundational. None of them is used to justify moral requirements. My reading therefore makes sense of the structure of the Groundwork, the fact that Kant does not rely on these concepts when he says he justi es the categorical imperative as the standard view would lead one to expect.

Moreover, and more importantly, my reading prevents Kant s requirement of respect for others from being saddled with the high metaphysical demands of a non-relational value property, demands imposed by the standard reading of Kant.. Cf. CpV V 6 3 .: the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it .

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